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Antitrust By Chance:
A Unified Theory of Horizontal Merger Doctrine
Andrew Chin
In the three decades since United States v Von's Grocer)' Co.,' in which
the Supreme Court enjoined the merger of two grocery chains comprising a
total of 7.5% of the Los Angeles market, antitrust law has continued to lack
a unified economic framework to guide and justify the structural analysis of
horizontal mergers. 2 The development of the modern system of horizontal
merger analysis, focusing on market concentration, has not resolved the
incoherence and uncertainty in the underlying economic theory. To the
contrary, now that structural analysis of market concentration is a requisite
element of "virtually every" horizontal merger case,' antitrust jurisprudence
appears committed to a program of balancing uncertainties, weighing
econometric proxies, and applying decision rules to probabilistic statements of
fact: a regime of antitrust by chance.
1. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
2. Justice Stewart's famous dissenting remark in Von's Groceri. that "'[tlhe solc consistency that I can
find is that in litigation under § 7 [of the Clayton Act], the Government always wins." id at 301 tSteuart.
J., dissenting), remains largely unanswered. Although the government today would no longer challenge the
proposed merger in Von's Grocery, the courts--and, thus, the merging parties-hau e continued to follow
the guidelines established by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies. See Daniel I Gifford. The
Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REv. 1677, 1701 (1995) (noting that "the (Justicel Department's
enforcement criteria have become the effective law"); George A. Hay. Innovations in Antir'ut Enforcement.
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 7, 8 n.l (1995) ("The reason there are so few merger cases actually filed is that %%hen
the agencies signal a likely suit, the transaction is often abandoned.").
A horizontal merger is a combination of two or more companies that produce and sell the same
product in the same geographic market. See United States v. International Tel & Tel Corp. 306 F Supp
766, 774 (D. Conn. 1969). Because horizontal mergers unite direct competitors, the) arc of particular
antitrust concern. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Victor Hsu, The Ease of Entry Doctrine in Merger Law. Managing the Waste of In re
Echlin, 20 PAC. L.J. 75, 75-80 (1988) (describing development of antitrust jurisprudence regarding ease
of entry in absence of unified analytical framework).
4. Jay Greenfield, Beyond Herfindahl: Non-Structural Elements of Merger Anal'wiu. 53 ATrrRLST
L.J. 229, 229 (1984) ("Virtually every evaluation of a horizontal merger begins sith definition of the
relevant product and geographic markets, determination of the market shares of the competitors %, ithin those
markets and computations of market concentration before and after the acquisition in question "
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In particular, the use of static measures in merger analysis has tended to
obscure the fact that antitrust enforcement is directed toward the dynamic
behavior of markets. The federal antitrust enforcement agencies have attempted
to clarify that the analysis embodied in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines5
reflects "a dynamic, rather than a static, model of economic performance. ' 6
They have met with only limited success. As Daniel Oliver, former chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission, has observed:
[C]ounsel for merging parties-and even their economic advisers-
frequently treat the Guidelines as if they were "a set of rigid
mathematical formulas," and a checklist of points to be covered....
As a result, doing the arithmetic discussed in the Guidelines, without
doing the thinking they require, inevitably tends to conceal the
dynamics of any market.7
5. The term "Horizontal Merger Guidelines" will be used throughout this Note to refer to the
Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992). See also infra notes
12-13, 54 and accompanying text.
6. 60 Minutes with Daniel Oliver Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTIrRUST L.J. 235, 238
(1988) (statement of Daniel Oliver, Chairman).
7. Id. A simple example illustrates the potential problem with treating the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines as a set of formulas based on a static view of the market. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market concentration, which is calculated by
summing the squares of the market shares held by the respective firms. For example, an industry consisting
of two firms with market shares of 70% and 30% has an HHI of 70+30, or 5800. See generally Richard
A. Miller, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a Market Structure Variable: An Exposition for Antitrust
Practitioners, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 593 (1982) (explaining calculation and interpretation of HHI).
Suppose, as in Table I, an industry consists of four firms, A, B, C, and D, which in Year 0 have
market share percentages of 40, 30, 20, and 10, respectively. Consider two scenarios for the market
distribution in Year 1: (I) In one scenario, each of the leading firms A and B yields a 5% share to the
smaller firms; (II) in another, the distribution is completely inverted, with the large firms utterly unable to
maintain their dominance. In assigning a higher concentration index to the market in scenario 11 than to
the market in scenario I, the HHI fails to account for the much greater ease with which firms C and D were
able to compete in scenario II. As noted in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 986 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), where market shares are "volatile and shifting," concentration statistics evaluated "at any given
point in time" may present a misleading picture of a market's competitive structure.
Scenario H is not necessarily unrealistic. As noted in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486, 502 (1974), short-term market share may be unrelated to a company's future ability to compete.
In that case, the Supreme Court allowed the acquisition of United Electric by a leading coal producer,
because the appropriate measure of future market power was the share of unsold recoverable reserves, not
the present market share. United Electric ranked fifth among Illinois coal producers in annual production,
but ranked only tenth in reserve holdings. See id.
The bulk of the coal produced is delivered under long-term requirements contracts, and such
sales thus do not represent the exercise of competitive power but rather the obligation to fulfill
previously negotiated contracts at a previously fixed price .... In a market where the
availability and price of coal are set by long-term contracts rather than immediate or short-term
purchases and sales, reserves rather than past production are the best measure of a company's
ability to compete.
Id. at 501-02.
Although these conditions may have been peculiar to the coal industry, courts repeatedly have cited
Justice Stewart's opinion in General Dynamics to reduce the defendant's burden in rebutting market share
data. See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986)
("Market share is just a way of estimating market power, which is the ultimate consideration.... Market
share reflects current sales, but today's sales do not always indicate power over sales and price
tomorrow."). See generally Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d at 990-91 (describing effect of General Dynamics
case on Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence).
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The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines do express a rational, coherent enforcement policy, informed by the
dynamic behavior of market structure. This Note supplies a dynamic market
model that enables the reinterpretation of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines as
an internally consistent framework of statistical inference. Within this
framework, each piece of evidence can be weighed according to its statistical
certainty; one factor does not automatically trump another. Specifically, this
Note provides and illustrates a method for interpreting the evidentiary factors
that have been most frequently dispositive in recent merger case law: market
concentration, ease of entry, and concentration trends.
Horizontal merger analysis in the courts usually begins with the calculation
of the concentration within the relevant market before and after the proposed
merger. The government may establish a presumption of illegality by showing
that the merger would "produce 'a firm controlling an undue percentage share
of the relevant market, and [would] result[] in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market."'" Alternatively, the government may
demonstrate that the merger would "significantly increase the concentration of
an already highly concentrated market." 9 This presumption may be rebutted
by "'[nonstatistical evidence which casts doubt on the persuasive quality of
the statistics to predict future anticompetitive consequences,' such as: 'ease of
entry into the market, the trend of the market either toward or away from
concentration, and the continuation of active price competition.""10
Since 1982, horizontal merger analysis has relied heavily upon the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index" (HHI) of market concentration. The federal
antitrust enforcement agencies' 2 and attorneys general at the state
TABLE 1. EXAMPLE OF FAILURE OF HHI TO REFLECT A HIGHLY COMPETTl1VE MARKET
FIRM YEAR 0 YEAR I
SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 11
A 40% 35% 10%
B 30% 25% 20%
C 20% 25% 30%
D 10% 15% 40%
HHI 3000 2700 3000
8. FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (1lth Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)).
9. Id. at 1219; see also Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d at 983.
10. University Health, 938 F.2d at 1218 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC. 652 F.2d
1324, 1341 (7th Cir. 1981)).
11. See supra note 7.
12. The index first appeared in the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines in 1982. See Department
of Justice 1992 Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493. 28.497 (1982). The guidelines were revised in
1984 and 1992, retaining the HHI as the measure of market concentration. See Department of Justice 1984
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level13 have adopted the HHI for its convenience and power-a single
statistic that can be cited both to describe the structure of an industry and to
shift a court's presumption away from allowing horizontal mergers between
sufficiently large firms within that industry. 4 Despite some initial
skepticism,'5 the courts have also come to prefer the HHI as a measure of
market concentration in reviewing challenges to horizontal mergers.
16
The use of the HHI statistic as a proxy for anticompetitive market structure
has left the Horizontal Merger Guidelines vulnerable to attack. 7 Comparing
the HHI with the previously favored four- and eight-firm concentration
ratios," critics have questioned the HIHI's algebraic properties"' and
econometric explanatory power20 Although these measurement errors are
significant, they need not invalidate the HHI statistic as evidence of market
power at trial; after all, every piece of evidence carries an element of
uncertainty. The HHI of a market may be used appropriately within a
framework of statistical inference which gives commensurate weight to
presumptions and countervailing evidence. 2' The dominant interpretation of
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, however, is that the presumption of market
power is fixed upon market concentration thresholds that were either arbitrarily
chosen22 or based on static models of market behavior.2 3 Understood in this
Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,830 (1984); Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,557 (1992). Since 1982, the agencies' policies have converged, and
the Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Horizontal Merger Guidelines) reflect current
FTC policy on horizontal mergers. See Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed.
Reg. 41,552.
13. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,406, at 21,203 (Mar. 10, 1987).
14. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
15. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 323 n.15 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(mentioning but not calculating HHI); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg., 430 F. Supp. 729, 748-49
n.38 (D. Md. 1976) (rejecting HHI because of its incomparability to concentration ratios).
16. See, e.g., Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 875 (W.D.N.Y. 1994);
Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
17. See Neil B. Cohen & Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Nev Antitrust
Merger Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEx. L. REv. 453, 505-07 (1983) (criticizing
emphasis on HHI statistics in 1982 Merger Guidelines).
18. The k-firm concentration ratio of any market is the combined market share of the k largest firms.
19. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 12.3a2, at 457-63 (1994); see
also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw J 913.1c (Supp. 1996); David S.
Weinstock, Some Little-Known Properties of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: Problems of Translation and
Specification, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 705 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Cohen & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 485-99; John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Herfindahl Index
in Theory and Practice, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 915, 937-46 (1985).
21. See generally SIR RICHARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY (2d ed. 1983)
(applying probability theory to common law concepts of presumption and evidence).
22. Former Assistant Attorney General William Baxter, the chief architect of the 1982 DOJ Guidelines,
wrote that the thresholds "have no magical qualities" beyond the fact that "we were bom with ten fingers
and have gotten used to a base ten system." William F. Baxter, A Justice Department Perspective, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 287, 292 (1982).
23. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
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way, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines fail to quantify standards for rebuttal.2"
This is bad statistics and bad law.
Ultimately, the use of the HHI as a proxy for the competitive structure of
a given market entails particular statistical assumptions about the market's
dynamic behavior. This Note will supply one possible set of dynamic
assumptions5 that will provide a unifying framework for interpreting the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Within this framework, the HHI thresholds are
meaningful, not arbitrary, and the quantitative standards for rebuttal are well-
defined, yet flexible.
Part I of this Note reviews the role of market concentration in the context
of federal antitrust enforcement. Part II surveys recent decisions that have used
the HHI in analyzing the effects of horizontal mergers. Part III presents the
notion of a stochastic market model as a framework for analyzing merger
cases. Part IV demonstrates the framework's applicability to the analytical
factors indicated in Part II. Part V uses a horizontal merger case, United States
v. Country Lake Foods, Inc.,26 to illustrate the framework's potential
contribution to the substantive law. Part VI concludes with a discussion of
further consequences of the theory.
I. MARKET CONCENTRATION AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
A horizontal merger has one certain effect: At the moment of the merger,
it increases the concentration of the market. It is less clear that the merger
creates market power, harms consumers, or makes an eventual monopoly more
likely. Even so, the passage of the Sherman Act established as public policy
the nation's concern with the empirical relationship between horizontal mergers
and monopoly market power.27 Consequently, market concentration has
always been cognizable under the antitrust laws as an indicator of market
power.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act (as amended in 1950) prohibits any merger
or acquisition where "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."'' The Department of
Justice is authorized to prevent violations through equitable proceedings in the
federal district courts.29 The Federal Trade Commission may enforce section
7 through administrative proceedings in the agency and injunctive actions in
24. See Hsu, supra note 3, at 80.
25. The proposed framework incorporates the stochastic market model developed by Robert Gibrat.
See infra Part III.
26. 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990).
27. See 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TuRNER. ANTTRUST LAW 1901, at 2 (1980) (-'llt was a
series of mergers, virtually monopolizing several leading industries, that was pnmanly responsiblc for the
passage of the Sherman Act.").
28. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
29. See id. § 25.
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the courts.30 Private parties may also seek injunctive relief and treble damages
from section 7 violations in the federal courts.3'
From the earliest years of section 7 jurisprudence, antitrust policy has been
directed toward mergers between sufficiently large firms in highly concentrated
markets. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States32 interpreted section 7 as a barrier
against "the rising tide of economic concentration" in American industry that
applied even "when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of
commerce was still in its incipiency., 33 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
elaborated a burden-shifting, structural analysis of horizontal mergers. In
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,34 the Court held that a rule of
presumptive illegality applies to a horizontal merger that causes a "significant
increase in [market] concentration" and produces a firm with an "undue
percentage [market] share., 35 Extending this rule in United States v.
Aluminum Co.,36 the Court held that horizontal mergers or acquisitions
causing even slight increases in concentration are presumptively illegal in
highly concentrated markets. 37 In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,3
mergers causing slight increases in concentration were also ruled illegal in
markets where there is a significant "trend toward concentration. 39
Market concentration has retained its central importance as a structural
measure of competition.40 In other respects, however, antitrust enforcement
regarding horizontal mergers has evolved substantially in the years since Von s
Grocery. First, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission,
in assuming primary responsibility for screening all mergers between large
firms for anticompetitive effect, have adopted guidelines establishing market
concentration thresholds below which mergers will not be challenged.4
Second, merger analysis now includes a broad range of market factors,
including ease of entry, that may be relevant to a finding of anticompetitive
effect.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197642 requires
30. See id. §§ 21, 53(a).
31. See id. § 26.
32. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
33. Id. at 317. The Court explained: "Congress saw the process of concentration in American business
as a dynamic force; it sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake
this force at its outset and before it gathered momentum." Id. at 317-18.
34. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
35. Id. at 363.
36. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
37. See id. at 279.
38. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
39. Id. at 277.
40. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines continue to confer a presumption of anticompetitive effect on
a merger that increases concentration in a concentrated market. See Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992); infra text accompanying notes 55-58.
41. See, e.g., Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
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that the parties to a merger between sufficiently large firms4 3 file "Pre-Merger
Notification" forms with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department
of Justice. Recognizing their limited resources, these agencies adopted a
simplified two-stage approach to merger review that was formalized in the
agency guidelines. The first stage identified markets in which concentration
was initially high and would increase significantly after a proposed merger.
The second stage determined whether firms could actually behave collusively
in those markets, taking into account a variety of market factors, including ease
of entry. Not surprisingly, the case law has evolved in response to the agency
guidelines. Today, "virtually every" horizontal merger case begins with a
computation of pre- and post-merger market concentration, before taking into
account other structural and nonstructural factors."
Of these rebuttal factors, ease of entry has received the most extensive
attention from the courts.45 To date, however, the courts have avoided taking
an analytical approach that quantitatively balances each factor in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines against the weight of the market concentration statistics,
preferring simply to let ease of entry "trump" concentration.-6 For instance,
in United States v. Waste Management, Inc.," the Second Circuit found that
entry into the trash collection business was sufficiently easy to overcome the
presumed anticompetitive effect evidenced by market concentration
statistics.48 In United States v. Calnar Inc., 9 a New Jersey district court
reached a similar decision, finding that any firm in the injection molding
business could enter the pump sprayer market. ° These rulings were
underscored in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.,5 ' a D.C. Circuit decision
written by then-Judge Clarence Thomas for a panel including then-Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, which found easy entry in a highly concentrated market
sufficient to overcome post-merger market power52 despite a lack of evidence
that entry would be "quick and effective.""
Thus, the recent case law on horizontal mergers might be expected to
conform closely to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines' market concentration
thresholds, except where the HHI statistics have been trumped by other factors.
The survey of recent horizontal merger cases in the next Part confirms this
43. Generally, the Act applies if either firm is engaged in interstate commerce. see id. § I 8a~aX I). and
a party with annual net sales or total assets of at least $100 million is acquirng a party with annual net
sales or total assets of at least $10 million, see id. § l8a(a)(2)(A).
44. See Greenfield, supra note 4, at 229.
45. See Hsu, supra note 3. at 75 ("The most significant new issue in merger analysis is case of
entry.").
46. See id
47. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
48. See id at 982.
49. 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.NJ. 1985).
50. See id. at 1306.
51. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
52. See id. at 987.
53. Id. at 988.
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expectation, and suggests the desirability of an analytical justification for the
thresholds and a quantitative framework for balancing market concentration
with ease of entry and other evidence.
II. THE HIHI IN THE COURTS
The Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) Horizontal Merger
Guidelines all use the HHI to indicate whether a particular horizontal merger
will result in a concentrated market and thereby increase the likelihood of a
challenge. 4 Since the first appearance of the HHI in each of the guidelines,
the substantive rules have remained unchanged. The guidelines uniformly
regard a market in which the post-merger HHI is below 1000 as
"unconcentrated," between 1000 and 1800 as "moderately concentrated," and
above 1800 as "highly concentrated. '55 A merger potentially "raise[s]
significant competitive concerns" if: (1) it produces an increase in the HHI of
more than 100 points in a moderately concentrated market;5 6 or (2) it
produces an increase in the HHI of more than 50 points in a highly
concentrated market.57 Further, a merger is presumed "likely to create or
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise" if it produces an increase in
the HHI of more than 100 points in a highly concentrated market.5 8
Recognizing that the post-merger HHI may overstate market power, the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines include other factors that may be considered in
assessing the potential anticompetitive effects of a merger: (1) coordinated
interaction among merging or competing firms; 59 (2) product differentiation
by merging firms;60 (3) capacity constraints on competing firms; 6' (4) ease
of entry for new firms; 62 (5) efficiencies claimed by merging firms; 63 and
(6) imminent failure of a merging firm.64 In addition to raising these issues,
54. See supra notes 12-13. The National Association of Attorneys General has promulgated its own
procedure for merger analysis, but uses the HHI statistic as an indicator of market concentration.
The DOJ and NAAG Horizontal Guidelines adopted nearly identical concentration level
standards for mergers subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act. Their main differences concern:
1) policy assumptions, 2) market definition methodologies, and 3) factors other than
concentration levels which should affect the decision whether to challenge a merger.
John Cirace, The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice and the National Association
of Attorneys General Compared in the Context of Recent Cases and Consent Decrees. 33 VILL. L. REV.
281, 288 (1988).




59. See id. at 41,558-59.
60. See id. at 41,559.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 41,561.
63. See id. at 41,562-63.
64. See id.
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a defendant may challenge the geographic and product market definitions used
to calculate the post-merger HHI.65
Table 2 presents the results of reported horizontal merger cases that have
used the HHI in merger analysis. The cases are generally arranged in
decreasing order of post-merger HHI. Each listing notes whether the merger
was held lawful (L) or unlawful (U) under section 1 of the Sherman Acts6
(S), section 7 of the Clayton Act67 (C), or both (C, S). Decisions concerning
preliminary injunctions are indicated by the letter "p."
Of the twenty-two merger challenges cited, fourteen were upheld and eight
were dismissed. In all of the successful challenges, the increase in HHI and the
post-merger HHI exceeded the DOJ thresholds. In all but one of the dismissed
challenges, either the DOJ thresholds were not violated (two cases) 68 or the
market concentration statistics were successfully rebutted by evidence showing
ease of entry (four cases) 69 or concentration trends (one case). ° With only
one exception, FTC v. Freeman Hospital,71 the outcome of each case in Table
2 was consistent with the burden-shifting analytical framework supplied by the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
The overall impression that emerges from an examination of Table 2 and
its accompanying footnotes is that of a case law heavily influenced by the HHI
thresholds for presumptive illegality, and therefore heavily reliant on the
65. See, e.g., United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669. 672 (D. Minn- 1990)
(rejecting government's geographic market definition and noting ease of entry in broader market), see also
infra Part V.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
67. Id. § 18.
68. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines. Inc.. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir 1986), United States
v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mich. 1985). off'd. 817 F2d 22 (6th Car. 1987).
69. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990): United States v Waste
Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F Supp.
669 (D. Minn. 1990); United States v. Calmar Inc.. 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.NJ. 1985).
70. New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods. Inc.. 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
71. 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995). aff'd. 69 F.3d 260 (8th Car. 1995). This preliminary
injunction hearing focused on "a battle of the experts" over the relevant geographic market definition. See
id. at 1217. In a decision affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. the distnct court accepted the defendant's
proposed service area, which provided a basis for calculating pre- and post-merger HHI statistics See id.
at 1221. The post-merger HHIs for beds, admissions, and patient census were 1322. 1496. and 1624.
respectively, reflecting increases due to the merger of 189. 251. and 222. respectoiely See id at 1222.
Thus, even on the defense expert's figures, the merger would result in significant increascs an concentration
in three concentrated markets, exceeding the DOJ thresholds. Finding that "the post-merger levels of HHI
will not exceed 1800," the court nevertheless concluded that "the FTC has failed to demonstrate that
competition will be substantially lessened as a result of this consolidation." Id. In determining that the
government had failed to prove the merger's prima facie illegality, the district court thus applied a higher
standard to the HHI statistics than that provided in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines-
Thus far, Freeman Hospital has been cited only to support the view that 'Idlefaning geographic
markets for medical care has proven no more tractable than geographic markets in general." ,Methodist
Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996). It remains to be seen v.hether Freeman
Hospital will set a precedent for further judicial departure from the analytical structure of the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines.
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF HORIZONTAL MERGER CASES USING THE HH1
72
CASE CLAIM RESULT MARKET PRE- POST-
MERGER MERGER
HHI HHI
Alliant C U, p 120mm tactical ammunition, n/a 10000
Techsystems73  U.S.
Tasty Baking74  C, S U, p Snack cakes and pies, 2
regions, 4 cities (min) 2354 2797
(max) 5197 6420
Ivaco75  C U, p Automatic tampers for rail 3549 5809
tracks, U.S.
Bon-Ton C, S U, p Traditional department stores, 3395 5074
Stores76  metropolitan area
Rice Growers 77  C U California paddy rice, Pacific 3276 4874
region
United Tote 78  C U Totalisators, North America 3940 4640
Rockford C, S U, p Hospital beds, 3-county area 2555 4603
Memorial79  Hospital admissions 2789 5111
Hospital days 3026 5647
72. Table 2 lists many of the horizontal merger decisions that have cited the DOJ Guidelines pertaining
to the HHI. Although probably not exhaustive, it is the result of an extensive search and appears to be
representative of the relevant case law. As Table 2 serves in part to update the table of horizontal merger
decisions provided in Areeda and Turner's 1980 treatise, the list is organized according to similar
conventions. See 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 27, 909b, at 33-51. The main difference is that the
individual market share and concentration ratio data have been replaced by the pre- and post-merger HHI
indices used in the application of the guidelines.
73. FTC v. Alliant Techsystems Inc., 808 F. Supp. 9, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding merger
demonstrated substantial likelihood of section 7 violation).
74. Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding likely
violation of section 7 in absence of evidence suggesting that HHI did not reflect anticompetitive impact).
75. United States v. Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409, 1419-20 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (finding HIl and
existing price competition between parties to joint venture provided prima facie case of section 7 violation).
76. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 875-76 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)
(finding that "market concentration would violate the recognized guidelines and would suggest dire
anticompetitive consequences").
77. United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n of California, Civ. No. S-84-1066 EJG, 1986 WL 12562, at
*11-12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1986) (finding section 7 violation where merger would substantially increase
concentration in already concentrated market).
78. United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 . Supp. 1064, 1069 (D. Del. 1991) (finding HHI statistics
established section 7 violation where barriers to entry were high and other considerations would not be
effective to redress anticompetitive effect).
79. United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1280, 1287 (N.D. III. 1989) ("Based
on an examination of the relevant market's concentration, barriers to entry, nature of competition, and
market participants, the court finds that the post-merger market is ripe for anti-competitive behavior."),
aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
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CASE CLAIM RESULT MARKET PRE- POST-
MERGER MERGER
HHI HHI
Baker Hughesm  C L Hardrock hydraulic 2878 4303
underground drilling rigs,
U.S.
University C U, p Inpatient services, acute care 2570 3200
Health"' hospitals, Augusta area
Waste C L Waste collection, Dallas area -3090
Management 2
Calmar 3  C L, p Plastic pump sprayers, U.S. 2302 3040




Illinois Cereal C U, p Dry corn milled food 2114 2606
Mills," products, U.S.
Kraft General C, S L Ready-to-eat cereals. U.S.
Foods8 6  1992 2215 2281
1994 2048 2137
Bass Brothers" C U, p Carbon black production. U.S. 1669 2238
Central State S L Commercial banking. two 2161 2182
Bank 8  counties
80. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981. 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that distrct court
concluded that "entry was likely, particularly if [the merger] were to lead to supmcompetitive pncing")
81. FI'C v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206. 1211 n.12. 1219 (1lth Cir. 1991) (finding HHI
statistics established prima facie case of anticompetitive effect).
82. United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) (i[Market entryl is
so easy that any anti-competitive impact of the merger before us would be eliminated more quickly by such
competition than by litigation."). The HHI figure was estimated from market share data. See id. at 981.
83. United States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (D.NJ. 1985) (finding HHI statistics
insufficient to establish section 7 violation because of ease of entry into pump sprayer market).
84. United States v. Country Lake Foods. Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669. 673 (D. Minn. 1990) (finding HHI
statistics insufficient to establish section 7 violation where several remote competitors were prepared to
enter government's geographic market).
85. FTC v. Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1131, 1144-45 (N.D. Ill. 1988). aff'd .ub nom.
FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding concentration statistics strongly supported
finding of anticompetitive effect).
86. New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding HHI
statistics viewed in light of "long term trend of reduced concentration in the RTE cereal industry" did not
create presumption of section 7 violation).
87. FTC v. Bass Bros. Enters., Nos. C84-1304, C84-1311. 1984 WL 355. at °8 (N.D. Ohio June 6.
1984) (finding concentration statistics demonstrated prima facie violation of section 7).
88. United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F Supp. 1276. 1295 (W.D. Mich. 1985). aff'd. 817 F2d
22 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that even under Guidelines, proposed acquisition was not unreasonably
anticompetitive).
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89. Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 600 F. Supp. 1326, 1329 n.3 (E.D.
Mich. 1985), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding uncontested concentration statistics
"overwhelmingly support[ed] the inference that the proposed merger would substantially lessen
competition").
90. California v. American Stores Co., 697 F. Supp. 1125, 1130-31 (C.D. Cal. 1988), modified, 872
F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding post-merger concentration statistics and concentration trends
overwhelmingly created presumption of anticompetitive effect).
91. FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir.
1995). Post-merger levels of HII below 1800 were a sufficient basis for the court to conclude that "the
FTC has failed to demonstrate that competition will be substantially lessened as a result of this
consolidation." Id.
92. Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
modified sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
post-takeover concentration and entry barriers made gold market "a prime candidate for monopolization").
93. United States v. LTV Corp., No. 84-884, 1984 WL 21973, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1984)
(ordering divestiture to prevent undue post-merger concentration in stainless cold-rolled sheet and strip
market).
94. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (pre-
merger Hill of 520 was "low on the range of unconcentrated markets," id. at 220 (emphasis omitted); post-
merger HHI of 868 was "still well below the top border for 'unconcentrated markets,"' id.; and HHI
statistics made plaintiff's characterization of market as tight oligopoly "merely absurd," id. at 221).
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CASE CLAIM RESULT MARKET PRE- POST-
MERGER MERGER
HHI HHI
Christian C U, p Beer, Upper Midwest 1746 2120
Schmidt 9
American C U, p Supermarkets, 14 MSAs 1795 2040
Stores" (average for all MSAs)
Freeman C L, p Hospital beds, 13 county area 1133 1322
Hospital9 ' Hospital admissions 1245 1496
Hospital patient census 1402 1624
Consolidated C, S U, p Gold sales, noncommunist 735.1 1223.2
Gold Fields' countries
LTV93  C U Hot rolled carbon and alloy 871 1047
strip, U.S.
Cold rolled carbon and alloy 953 1146
strip, U.S.
Stainless cold rolled sheet and 2190 2898
strip, U.S.
Rothery S L Van lines, U.S. 520 <868
Storage9
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internal consistency and precision of the underlying theory.95 In addition, the
case law pertaining to countervailing factors such as ease of entry and
concentration trends appears to rely on a small number of necessarily
idiosyncratic decisions.96 The five decisions surveyed here in which evidence
of market concentration was successfully rebutted thus warrant further
discussion.
In United States v. Waste Management,97 the Second Circuit reversed a
district court decision barring a merger between two Texas waste disposal
firms. Relying on General Dynamics9" for the proposition that market share
data may not reflect market power, the court concluded that market entry "is
so easy that any anti-competitive impact of the merger before us would be
eliminated more quickly by such competition than by litigation." 99 To
emphasize the relevance of ease of entry as an affirmative defense, the court
noted its inclusion as a factor in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: "If the
Department of Justice routinely considers ease of entry as relevant to
determining the competitive impact of a merger, it may not argue to a court
addressing the same issue that ease of entry is irrelevant."'"
The Waste Management decision was followed in United States v. Calnar
Inc.,' O' where the district court allowed a merger in a highly concentrated
market, because ease of entry ensured that "the producers in the market could
not long sustain an unjustified price increase."' 02 Noting a lack of entry
barriers' '3 and chronicling the history of entry into the market since the
1950s,' 04 the court concluded that despite the merger, "it is highly unlikely
that the market dynamics will change .... The reason for this is the ease of
entry."' 10 5
95. Areeda and Turner caution against interpreting the:r own table as a claim that market share data
were dispositive in all of the decisions cited. "[H]ighlighting market shares and concentration ratios.
especially where no other factors are mentioned, may invite the inference that the tmbunal's decision
depended solely on those numbers. Such an inference would sometimes be overdrawn." 4 AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 27, 1 909b, at 33. Although Table 2 indicates an even stronger relationship between
decisions and market concentration statistics, the same caution applies here.
96. Some law review articles and treatises discussing these factors have resorted to infcmng doctrne
from one or two cases. See, e.g., AREEDA & HovENKAMiP. supra note 19. '1 914 (citing FTC v War'rer
Communications, 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984) (on relevance of concentration trends)). William F Baxter.
Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View. 71 CAL. L. REV. 618. 630 (1983) (citing United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (on relevance of concentration trends)); Hsu. supra note 3. at
77, 79 (citing Waste Management, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 498 (on ease of entry); United States v Calmar Inc..
612 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (D.N.J. 1985) (same)).
97. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
98. 415 U.S. 486 (1974); see supra note 7.
99. 743 F.2d at 983.
100. Id.
101. 612 F Supp. 1298.
102. Id. at 1301.
103. See id. at 1305.
104. See id. at 1306.
105. Id.
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In United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.,' 6 the D.C. Circuit affirmed a
district court decision disregarding high market concentration statistics where
market shares were "volatile and shifting."' 7 The product market at issue,
hydraulic drilling rigs, was so "miniscule" in the United States that a single
contract "could catapult a firm from last to first place."'0 8 The Baker Hughes
court also rejected the "quick and effective" standard suggested by Waste
Management,'09 noting that "evidence regarding specific competitors and
their plans... is rarely available" to defendants."0  To rebut the
government's prima facie case, it was sufficient for the district court to find
that future entry was likely."'
In New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc.," 2 a merger that barely
exceeded the HHI thresholds was subjected to a sophisticated economic
analysis. Noting that the Horizontal Merger Guidelines "are helpful in
providing an analytical framework for evaluating an acquisition, but ... are
not binding upon the court,"' 3 the district court revived 1970s case law to
justify its consideration of concentration trends.' "4 Noting a "long term trend
of reduced concentration in the [ready-to-eat] cereal industry," the court
determined that the market share data did not create a presumption of a
Clayton Act section 7 violation." 5 Lacking this presumption, the state was
unable to provide a persuasive theory of anticompetitive effect." 16
The remaining case, United States v. Country Lake Foods Inc.,"7 is the
case study that is discussed in Part VI.
III. THE GIBRAT MODEL
As the cases reviewed in Part II indicate, merger analysis in modern
antitrust jurisprudence relies on a combination of static structural measures
(e.g., market concentration and entry barriers) and assumptions about the
dynamics of market structure (e.g., that entry, market share volatility, and/or
the trend toward deconcentration will continue). For example, when the Baker
106. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
107. Id. at 986.
108. Id.
109. 743 E2d 976, 981-84 (2d Cir. 1984).
110. 908 F.2d at 987.
111. See id.
112. 926 F Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
113. Id. at 359 n.9.
114. See id. at 361 ("The starting point for the court's analysis of the likely effect of the Acquisition
on competition in the RTE cereal market is consideration of the level of and trend toward economic
concentration in that market. See Stanley Works v. FrC, 469 F2d 498, 503 (1972)."). The court also cited
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), and United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974). See Kraft Gen. Foods, 926 F Supp. at 321.
115. Kraft Gen. Foods, 926 F Supp. at 363.
116. See id. at 363-66.
117. 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990).
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Hughes court argued that market shares were so "volatile and shifting"' " ,
that the HHI statistic was an unreliable indicator of the market's competitive
structure, it made a quantitative assertion about measurement error in a
dynamic system. Similarly, the Kraft General Foods decision, in noting a trend
toward deconcentration, suggested that the structural dynamics of the cereal
market effectively raised the state's burden in showing anticompetitive effect
from HHI statistics.119
Such assertions implicitly appeal to dynamic predictive models of market
structure in which the parameters governing changes in market share and
market concentration are inferred from past history and present conditions.
Without an explicit, well-defined, dynamic model of market structure, however,
it is impossible to assess the predictive power of these analyses, and therefore
imprudent to apply the resulting decisions as precedent.
The remainder of this Note supplies one possible dynamic model of market
structure and illustrates how it can be used as the basis for a balancing analysis
that reinterprets the Horizontal Merger Guidelines as a unified system of
statistical inference. The proposed framework quantifies measurement error in
the HHI statistic by modeling market structure as a stochastic process first
specified by Robert Gibrat.' 21 In this dynamic, stochastic model, a market
consists of n initially equal firms' -21 that are subject to independent,
identically distributed, randomly varying annual growth rates. Observed market
concentration in the Gibrat model consists of two components: a stochastic
component depending solely on the known probability distribution of the
growth rates-hereinafter referred to as the competitive structure of the
market122-and a purely random component, which depends solely on
chance. Within this framework, the task of the courts in horizontal merger
cases is to draw valid statistical inferences about the competitive structure of
markets from observed levels of market concentration.
The Gibrat framework represents a radical departure from the static,
classical theories traditionally cited in support of the HHI,'23 and it is by no
means the only possible set of assumptions governing dynamic market
behavior. The analysis of a particular merger case within this framework will
be conclusive only to the extent that the underlying theory provides a suitable
structural model for the relevant market.
118. 908 F.2d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
119. See 926 F. Supp. at 363.
120. See Michael Kalecki, On the Gibrat Disirbution. 13 ECONOMETRICA 161 (1945)
121. As applied to a given market definition, the parameter it may include both existing firms and
potential entrants, provided that all firms face the same distnbution of growth rates
122. Cf YuJI DIRI & HERBERT A. SIMON, SKEW DIsTRIBLONS AND TilE StzEs OF BuSINESS FiRSts
150 (1977) ("If firm sizes are determined by a stochastic process. then the appropriate way to think about
public policy in this area is to consider the means by which the stochastic process can be altered, and the
consequences of employing these means.").
123. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Ohgopoby. 72 J. POL. ECoN. 44. 45-48 (1964) (relating HHI
to likelihood of effective collusion).
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For the purposes of this Note, however, the Gibrat theory is a structurally
and empirically adequate dynamic model of market structure. The characteristic
feature of the Gibrat model, the hypothesis that large and small firms face the
same distribution of growth rates, is inaccurate for some industries," 4 but
appropriate for the domain of antitrust policy. Generally, industries in which
large firms systematically face significantly higher growth prospects are natural
monopolies requiring regulation to maintain competition, and industries that
structurally favor small firms are naturally competitive. The stochastic nature
of the Gibrat theory also makes it well-suited to a merger analysis that
includes probabilistic statements about firm behavior, including the likelihood
of market entry.' 5
In their leading textbook on market structure, Scherer and Ross describe
a simulation experiment that periodically measured the four-firm concentration
ratio of a market based on the Gibrat model with n=50. The authors observed
that "[p]attems resembling the concentrated structures of typical manufacturing
industries emerge within a few decades."'' 2 6 Many other studies2 7 have
provided a sufficient empirical basis for concluding that "chance plainly does
play a role in company growth and ... actual firm size distributions often
correspond to those predicted by stochastic growth models."' 28 In contrast,
classical deterministic economic theory "provides no explanation for the
repeated appearance of [observed market share] distributions," and therefore,
"either predicts the facts incorrectly or ... makes no prediction at all.' 29
Given that deterministic economic models of the HHI are often founded on
"arbitrary and internally inconsistent" assumptions, 130 a stochastic framework
that recognizes the chance element in market development seems
comparatively realistic and appropriate.
Scherer and Ross attempt to explain the concentration observed in their
simulation experiments by the "run of luck" enjoyed by the leading firms:
"[O]nce a firm has, by virtue of early good luck, placed itself among the
industry leaders, it can achieve additional market share gains if it should
happen again to be luckier than average (as it will be in roughly half of all
124. See generally David S. Evans, Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth, 95 i. POL. ECON.
657-74 (1987) (finding weak negative correlation between growth and size among U.S. firms).
125. The Department of Justice has faced difficulties in attempting to analyze likelihood of entry
within the Merger Guidelines' static, deterministic microeconomic framework. See Hsu, supra note 3, at
83 & n.38.
126. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
141 (3d ed. 1990).
127. See IJIRI & SIMON, supra note 122, at 110; RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE chs. 12-14 (1982).
128. SCHERER & Ross, supra note 126, at 146.
129. IJIRI & SIMON, supra note 122, at 10.
130. Cohen & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 486. One standard assumption is that each firm in a market
behaves as though the output of every other firm is constant (the Coumot hypothesis). See id. at 487.
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cases)." 13' This explanation is obviously incomplete because in the other half
of all cases a leading firm will lose market share.
The analysis in the Appendix provides a more persuasive and informative
explanation for Scherer and Ross's experimental results by estimating the
overall distribution of the concentration of Gibrat markets. In the analysis, I
consider a Gibrat market defined with the following properties: (1) the market
consists of n equal-sized firms in Year 0; (2) if e,, represents the rate of growth
in year i of firm j, l<_i:_t, l<j~n, then the random variables zq=log(l+e,,) are
normally distributed with mean z and variance s,. 132 For this market, the
Herfindahl index has a "ratio of sums of lognormals" distribution:
e,) 2
I~ Ejnln +ed)
= I exp(2X)J( ; 1exp(XJ))
where the x 's are independent, identically normally distributed random
variables.'33
The lack of a closed-form probability distribution function for finite sums
of lognormals' 4 appears to impede systematic study of concentration in
stochastic market models. 135 For sufficiently large n, however, a sum of n
lognormals can be approximated by a single lognormal.'3 This fact leads to
several results concerning the variability of the HHI that are discussed here and
proved in the Appendix.
The results in the Appendix provide estimates for finite sums of
lognormals and, thus, the distribution of the observed HHI, given the number
of firms n, the variance of growth rates s2, and the duration of the model t.
131. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 126. at 142.
132. Throughout this Note, all logarithms and exponential functions use the natural base e -2 718
unless otherwise specified.
133. See Appendix, Proposition 2.
134. This is a major open problem in statistics, and has been studied for sonic time b) electrical
engineers in a variety of signal processing contexts: "'The characterization of the sum [of lognormals] is
of importance in multihop scatter systems, log-normal shadowing ensironments. target detection in clutter.
and the general problem of propagation through a turbulent medium." S C Schartz & YS Ych. On the
Distribution Function and Moments of Power Sums with Log.Normal C'omponents. 61 BELL SYs
TECHNICAL J. 1441, 1441-42 (1982).
135. See LIIRI & SIMON, supra note 122, at 5 ("Illn all but the simplest cases closed solutions for the
diffusion processes may not be available. As a safeguard against tnsufficient rigor leading to incorrect
conclusions, we have done a considerable amount of simulation .... ").
136. See N.A. Marlow, A Normal Limit 77Teorem for Power Sums of Independent Random Variable3.
46 BELL Sys. TECHNICAL J. 2081, 2082 (1967). This result, presented as an explanation of obsered
distributions in noise levels on trunk lines, does not appear to have reached the literature on the lognormal
distribution of firm size.
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These estimates confirm Scherer and Ross's observation that the concentration
of a Gibrat market may be expected to increase steadily over time.
These results can be used to quantify measurement error in the HHI
statistic by estimating confidence intervals for the HHI for a Gibrat market
with n firms, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.137 Table 3 is suitable for
estimating minimum p values to rebut the presumption of illegality. It
demonstrates that the probability that observed HHI falls into the indicated
interval is at most 90%. Table 4 is suitable for estimating maximum p values
to show presumptive illegality. It demonstrates that the probability that
observed HHI falls into the indicated interval is at least 90%.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
As the courts continue to address the merger analysis suggested by the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, they will face increasingly complex findings of
probabilistic economic facts. The presence of statistical error throughout the
analysis calls for a balancing approach that assigns to each piece of evidence
a weight commensurate with its statistical certainty. The Gibrat theory offers
such a balancing framework.
Tables 3 and 4, as derived from the Gibrat theory, provide a basis for
assessing the statistical certainty associated with market concentration, ease of
entry, and concentration trends, and, thus, the evidentiary weight that should
be assigned to each of these factors in a balancing approach to merger
analysis. In general, the market concentration thresholds in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines establish a statistically significant presumption that a market
is structurally anticompetitive. Ease of entry evidence can rebut this
presumption by changing the parameters of the market model, thereby
attenuating the inferential power of the market concentration statistics. A
concentration trend, if steady and substantial, can provide relevant evidence
about a market's competitive structure by forecasting the equilibrium
concentration of the market. These findings are described in detail below.
A. Market Concentration
Areeda and Turner's leading antitrust treatise recognizes the case n=12 as
a threshold for the minimum number of equivalent sellers in a market needed
137. For example, Table 3 indicates that in 100 simulations of a Gibrat market with n=50 firms and
an expected HI of 500, at most 90 would be expected to result in an HHI of between 143.0 and 1748.2,
and so at least 10 runs would be expected to result in an HHI of less than 143.0 or greater than 1748.2.
Table 4 indicates that at least 90 such simulations would be expected to result in an HHI of between 106.7
and 2342.2. This Note presents only approximate bounds indicating the widest and narrowest possible
confidence intervals, based on an asymptotic estimation of the distribution of observed HHI values by the
normal distribution.
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TABLE 3. ESTIMATED 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR OBSERVED HHI OF
GIBRAT MARKETS USING LOWER BOUND ON VARIANCE
NUMBER EXPECTED HHI
OF FIRMS 500 1000 1800 3000
MIN MAX MIN MAX MIN MAX MIN MAX
12 - - 934.9 1069.6 575.0 5634.7 30.0 10000.0
15 - - 774.6 1291.0 253.7 10000.0 27 10000.0
20 500.0 500.0 502.1 1991.6 50.8 10000.0 - -
25 468.1 534.1 294.1 3400.3 7.9 10000.0 - -
30 417.4 599.0 159.3 6276.4 1.0 100000 - -
40 307.2 813.8 38.7 10000.0 - I-
50 210.4 1188.0 7.6 10000.0 . . . .
TABLE 4. ESTIMATED 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR OBSERVED HHI OF
GIBRAT MARKETS USING UPPER BOUND ON VARIANCE
NUMBER EXPECTED HHI
OF FIRMS 500 1000 1800 3000
MIN MAX MIN MAX MIN MAX MIN MAX
12 - - 522.0 1915.5 164.3 10000.0 5.4 10000.0
15 - - 351.4 2845.7 69.0 10000.0 0.5 10000.0
20 500.0 500.0 201.2 4969.6 13.4 10000.0 0.0 10000.0
25 299.0 836.0 112.6 8880.8 2.1 10000.0 0.0 10000.0
30 238.6 1047.4 59.8 10000.0 0.3 10000.0 0.0 10000.0
40 160.9 1553.6 14.2 10000.0 0.0 10000.0 0.0 10000.0
50 106.7 2342.2 2.8 10000.0 0.0 10000.0 0.0 10000.0
to assure competitive pricing. 38 Consider, therefore, a Gibrat market with
138. See 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 27. 908. at 27 ("T]here is a substantial consensus that
independent pricing among sellers of a homogeneous product is likely to occur in a market with as few as
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n=12 firms and expected HHI=1000' 39 Table 4 indicates that the probability
that the observed value of the HHI is between 522.0 and 1915.5 is at least
90%.140 In other words, a Gibrat market that is structurally competitive (n=12
and E(HHI)=100O) by DOJ standards has at most a 5% chance of appearing
in the upper tail of this HHI distribution, i.e., having an observed HHI above
1915.5.
As this example illustrates, the Gibrat theory provides an independent
justification for the selection of the threshold HHI value of 1800 as a trigger
point for antitrust enforcement. In 1000 structurally competitive Gibrat
markets, the observed HHI would be expected to exceed 1800 in at most 65
cases.141 To the extent that the Gibrat model is acceptable as an explanation
for observed market concentration, an HHI value exceeding 1800 serves as
prima facie evidence that a market is structurally anticompetitive.
In addition to providing a dynamic interpretation of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, the framework may have the further salutary effect of focusing
antitrust enforcement on strategic industries. In the Gibrat model, the expected
HHI is an increasing function of the variance of the firms' annual growth rates,
and high variance in growth rates appears to be associated with small
businesses in highly innovative fields.1
42
An interesting property of Tables 3 and 4 is that as the expected HHI
increases, the confidence intervals for the observed HHI grow wider. This
property of market concentration in the Gibrat model cautions against
interpreting observed HHI values with excessive precision. The finding in Bon-
Ton Stores that an increase in the HHI of 1679 points to 5074 was "off the
charts" because it was "more than sixteen times" the DOJ threshold of 100
43
carries an unwarranted presumption of linearity and precision in the
interpretation of observed HHI values. If the court's task is to evaluate the
market concentration evidence as proof of market power, it should express its
conclusions in terms of the inferential power of the HHI statistics instead of
the raw statistics themselves. This Note provides a method by which it may do
SO.
10 to 12 equivalent sellers.
139. As Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 demonstrate, the parameters h=HHIIIOOOO and n fully specify
the competitive structure of the market; any discrepancy between 10000h and the observed value of the
HHI, I 0000exp(H,.), is an artifact of chance. See Appendix.
140. An interval that includes all values within 1.645 standard errors of the expected value of a
normally distributed random variable X is at least a 90% confidence interval for X. Corollary 2 gives an
approximate upper bound of n3h4+4h-51n a.1561 for the variance of Var(H,.), and so the standard error of
H,, is at most (.1561)a=.3951. Since E(H,)=log(.l)--2.0326, the interval -2.0326±(1.645)(.3951) is at least
a 90% confidence interval for the normal approximation to H,,. Since 10000 exp (-2.0326±(I .645)(.395 I))
z-522.0, 1915.5, the interval (522.0, 1915.5) is at least a 90% confidence interval for the observed HHI of
the Gibrat market.
141. In terms of statistical inference, an HHI value of 1800 corresponds to a p value of at most .065.
142. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 124, at 670-72.
143. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 876 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)
(emphasis omitted).
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B. Ease of Entry
The Scherer-Ross study, which considers the case n=50, demonstrates that
there is nothing sacrosanct about starting the Gibrat model with twelve equal-
sized firms. Low barriers to entry and minimum efficient scale in a market
can-and should-be reflected in the model by increasing n, thereby allowing
more firms into the competition for market share. '" The effect of such an
increase in n is a corresponding increase in the variance of the observed HHI,
which in turn reduces the inferential power of the market concentration
statistic. This effect, illustrated in Tables 3 and 4, corresponds closely to the
use of ease of entry evidence to rebut the presumption of illegality.
For example, a showing that the HHI for a market following a merger is
1915.5 may be rebutted by evidence that the market is more accurately
described by a twenty-five-firm Gibrat model than a twelve-firm scenario.
Referring to Table 3, when n=25, an observed HHI of 1915.5 falls well within
the 90% confidence interval and is found to correspond to a p-value of at least
0.191." 5 In other words, the odds against the possibility that the observed
high concentration (relative to the DOJ's 1000 threshold) is the result of
chance alone shorten from 19-1 to about 4-1. The rebuttal thereby has a direct
and significant effect on the likelihood of successful prosecution on the merits.
This effect can be explained intuitively: A market that starts with twenty-
five equal-sized firms is initially less concentrated than one that starts with
twelve, and so the process by which it becomes concentrated to an HHI of
1915.5 tends to be longer and subject to greater uncertainty.' This
uncertainty exposes the HHI to such anomalies as the example illustrated in
Table 1, where a significant change in the market shares of individual
companies is not necessarily reflected in a corresponding change in the HHI.
Consequently, an observed HHI of 1915.5 is much less informative about the
144. Note that increasing n has the effect of descnbing the market as comprising tso different Sets
of firms-existing firms that have attained positive current market share, and entrant fims that have
not-but subject to the same dynamic growth assumptions. This corresponds to the condition of barnerless
entry.
A more sophisticated analysis would consider the market as a system of birth and death proc ses
See IJIRI & SIMON, supra note 122, at 153-69. Such an analysis might also incorporate the theory of
contestable markets. See generally Elizabeth E. Bailey & \Viliam J. Baumol. Deregulation and the Theorv
of Contestable Markets, I YALE J. ON REG. II1 (1984) (describing contestability theory in context of
deregulation). Such analysis would be expected to yield results resembling those obtained here See
SCHERER & Ross, supra note 126, at 143 n.122 ("The [stochastic growth] distributions are sufficiently
similar that it is difficult to find statistical tests distinguishing which of several altemative stochastic
processes generated them.").
145. For a similar calculation, see supra note 140.
146. Areeda and Turner contend that 'once an industry has reached a particular degree of
concentration ... it is the present market structure that is critical, not the history of its getting there - 4
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 27, i 914. at 82. This argument neglects the fact that in some industries.
a trend toward concentration may be volatile, reducing confidence in the precision of a market snapshot.
See supra note 7.
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underlying conditions of a twenty-five-firm market than about those of a
twelve-firm market.
The defendant in a horizontal merger case has various options at trial for
making a claim about the value of n. 4 7 First, the number n, of existing firms
could serve as a crude lower bound for n.' 41 Second, the defendant could
make an economic argument that it would be reasonably likely that n-n, firms,
exercising proportionate market power, would enter the market before a
dominant firm could sustain a significant price increase. 49  Third, the
defendant could make an economic determination concerning the number of
new minimum-efficient-scale firms that could be accommodated by the
market.' 50 Finally, the defendant could forecast future market structure from
a historical pattern of market entry.'
5
'
The fair evaluation of ease of entry arguments requires that defendants
quantify their claims of low entry barriers and that judges balance these claims
against observed market concentration. As one observer has warned:
If a finding of "ease of entry" or "low entry barriers" is sufficient to
overcome prima facie illegality under Section 7, those terms of art
must be given substance and quantitative meaning. Otherwise, merger
inquiries will degenerate into a battle of the experts over obscure and
subjective evaluations of "low" and "high" barriers. Judges will have
the discretion to rewrite the antitrust laws to their liking, and litigants
will go on sprees of forum shopping.15 2
147. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, § 12.4c, at 474-76 (enumerating alternative forms of ease of
entry evidence).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 672 (D. Minn. 1990)
(rejecting government's claim that milk processing market consisted of only eight dairies in Minneapolis-St.
Paul MSA). A more refined estimate would be the reciprocal of the market share of the median firm. This
measure is based on empirical findings that minimum efficient plant scales are "significantly correlated
with ... the ratio of sales of plants at the midpoint of industry plant size distributions to total industry
sales." SCHERER & Ross, supra note 126, at 425.
149. See, e.g., Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. at 672-73 (discussing testimony of six distant dairies
that they would enter Minneapolis-St. Paul market in response to "nontransitory increase" in milk prices);
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, I1 (D.D.C. 1990) ("It appears likely to the Court,
however, that [in the event of merger] ... one or two ... companies will enter successfully sometime In
the future, because major United States customers, who are quite sophisticated and financially strong, will
insist on receiving alternate bids.").
The DOJ assumes an entry period of two years and a price increase of five percent. See Department
of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552,41,562 (1992). This baseline for market
definition has been criticized as "[construing] the relevant market too broadly." Gene C. Schaerr, Note, The
Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department's Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L., 670,
670-71 (1985). The framework presented here is independent of market definition methodologies and could
subsume Schaerr's proposed reforms.
150. See Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,562; see, e.g.,
United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982 (2d Cir. 1984) ("A person wanting to start
in the trash collection business can acquire a truck, a few containers, drive the truck himself, and operate
out of his home.").
151. See, e.g., United States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (D.N.J. 1985) (describing
historical entry in pump sprayer market).
152. Hsu, supra note 3, at 80.
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The framework in this Note fills the implied void, bringing substance and
quantitative meaning to the ease of entry rebuttal by making it commensurable
with the presumption of illegality based on HHI statistics.
C. Concentration Trends
Breaking with precedent,153 William F. Baxter, the chief architect of the
1982 DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines, stated in 1983 that as a matter of
policy, a trend toward market concentration would not be considered as a
factor in analyzing horizontal mergers.' The deletion of concentration
trends from the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines'" has won the
approval of some leading commentators.'56 On the other hand, the case law
indicates that trends toward market deconcentration will continue to be
considered in weighing the presumption of illegality based on HHI
statistics.
57
The Gibrat theory indicates that trends toward both concentration and
deconcentration are relevant in evaluating an observed HHI statistic. The law
of regression toward the meanis implies that trends in the observed HHI are
more likely than not to be directed toward the expected HHI determined by the
market's competitive structure. In particular, a defendant's contention that an
observed HHI of 1915.5 was a chance outlier from an expected HHI of 1000
would be more consistent with a long-term trend toward deconcentration than
with one toward concentration. Thus, as in Kraft General Foods,,5" a trend
toward deconcentration may constitute evidence in rebuttal of HHI-based prima
facie illegality. As the Gibrat framework makes clear, such a rebuttal amounts
to an assertion that the trend line is pointing away from a temporarily high
level of concentration and toward the underlying competitive structure of the
market.
Despite the relevance of concentration trends within the Gibrat framework,
it is clear that trend data should be evaluated with care and even skepticism.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.. 384 U.S. 546. 551 (1966). United States v Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966).
154. See Baxter, supra note 96, at 630.
155. The current NAAG guidelines continue to allow an attorney general to institute actions based on
trends toward concentration. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attornes
General, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,406. at 21,203 n.34 (Mar. 10. 1987).
156. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, § 914', at 761-62; cf. RICHARD A. POSNER.
ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIc PERSPECTIvE 101 (1976) (criticizing government's concern with trends
toward concentration).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Management. Inc., 743 F2d 976. 982 (2d Cir. 1984); New York
v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
158. The law of regression toward the mean states that probabilistic outcomes that are above the
expected value are more likely than not to be followed by lower outcomes. See. e.g.. DAVID F EDt.
ET AL., STATISTICS ch. 10 (1991). Thus an unusually high concentration level that was due to chance would
probably be followed by a steady and substantial trend toward deconcentration.
159. 926 F. Supp. at 363; see supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
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At best, a statistical argument based on regression toward the mean can only
test an alternative hypothesis, leaving the court to weigh competing
explanations of observed market concentration. To have inferential power, a
concentration trend should be both steady and substantial over a long time
period.
This Note has focused on only two of the factors that may rebut a prima
facie claim based on the HHI thresholds: ease of entry and concentration
trends. These factors were chosen because in all but one of the cases examined
in Table 2 in which the presumptive illegality was successfully rebutted, one
or both of these factors was dispositive.' 60 Further work will be needed to
determine the implications of the Gibrat theory for other factors discussed in
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.16
1
V. CASE STUDY: COUNTRY LAKE FOODS
United States v. Country Lake Foods Inc.162 clearly illustrates the role
that this Note's framework can have in balancing structural evidence in
horizontal merger cases. In 1990, the Department of Justice sought to enjoin
the acquisition by Country Lake Foods of a competing dairy, Superior-Dairy
Fresh Milk, as a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.163 The complaint
defined the relevant market as fluid milk suppliers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan statistical area (MSP/MSA), consisting of eight local dairies."
In this market, Country Lake and Superior were the second- and third-largest
sellers, with shares of 18.2% and 17.8%, respectively. 65 The acquisition
would increase the HHI of the market from 2186 to 2832.166 These market
concentration statistics triggered the government's motion for injunctive
relief. 167
The defendants countered with an alternative geographic market definition
that included dairies within a 350-mile radius of Minneapolis-St. Paul. 68
They argued that modern milk processing and transportation methods and a
relative lack of brand name differentiation had expanded the relevant
geographic market. 69 The district court agreed, persuaded by testimony by
160. The remaining case was FTC v. Freeman Hospital, 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (W.D. Mo. 1995),
aff'd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995). See supra notes 71, 91.
161. See Department of Justice 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,558-63
(1992) (describing anticompetitive practices, efficiencies, and imminent failure of merging firms). These
"nonstructural" factors are discussed further in Greenfield, supra note 4, at 242-45, 248-52.
162. 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990).
163. See id. at 670.
164. See id. at 671.
165. See id. at 673.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 671 ("[Ihe proposed acquisition ... may substantially lessen competition in the
relevant product and geographic markets.").
168. See id. at 672 n.3.
169. See id. at 672-73.
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several distant dairies that it was likely that they would begin selling milk in
Minneapolis-St. Paul if it became profitable for them.' Specifically, the
court found that five such dairies would definitely or probably enter the market
to fill orders from grocers in the MSP/MSA provided that they could sell from
excess capacity at a profitable price.' 7' Another dairy specified that it would
begin selling in the MSP/MSA if the price of milk rose by seven percent."-
Although none of the six distant dairies was a significant competitor in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul market in 1990,17 the court viewed them as a
safeguard against any market power that might be created by the merger.
Noting that distant dairies could profitably serve the entire MSP/MSA in the
event of a five percent price increase, the court concluded that consumers in
Minneapolis-St. Paul could "practicably turn to dairies outside the MSPIMSA
for fluid milk should a price increase occur based on a cartel among dairies in
the MSP/MSA." '7 Consequently, the government failed to meet its burden
of defining the relevant geographic market,' 75 and the court turned to
nonstructural factors in analyzing, and ultimately allowing, the proposed
acquisition. 17
6
The simplicity and reasonableness of this economic argument disguised the
extent to which the court relied on unfounded conjectures in dismissing the
government's structural claims. The court defined the geographic market to
include both the eight MSP/MSA dairies and the six distant dairies, but then
envisioned a postacquisition market segmented into two submarkets:
MSP/MSA dairies, which may be inclined to cartelize, and distant dairies,
which can be relied upon to prevent cartelization. The court cannot have it
both ways. If both groups of dairies were really in the same market, then all
firms would benefit from cartelization and monopoly rents. The proper inquiry
should be whether the overall structure of the postacquisition market presented
a substantial risk of anticompetitive firm behavior. For this inquiry, the court
would have to have heeded the government's HHI statistics. Since the distant
dairies possessed negligible aggregate market share in Minneapolis-St. Paul,
the HHI of the MSA eight-dairy submarket was a good estimate of the HHI
of the overall fourteen-dairy market. Instead, the court threw the market
concentration statistics out with the geographic market definition.
Even more troubling was the court's failure to quantify the force of its
market entry argument. Would the court's reasoning have applied if Country
Lake Foods and Superior each had held half of the MSP/MSA market and
170. See id. at 672.
171. See id. at 672-73.
172. See id. at 673.
173. The top four milk producers in the MSP/MSA had an aggregate market share of 90 2% following
the proposed acquisition. See id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 673-74.
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were merging to monopoly? What if Minneapolis-St. Paul consumers had had
only one distant dairy waiting in the wings? Short of these extremes, how
many points of excess HHI may a potential entrant firm excuse? The court is
silent on these critical issues.
By showing how market concentration statistics and ease of entry
arguments may be balanced quantitatively, the analytic framework in this Note
provides tentative answers to these questions. Although these answers are
neither precise nor dispositive, they do supply a rationale for distinguishing the
court's decision from the unattractive hypotheticals above.
As Table 4 indicates, the postacquisition HHI of 2832 still has evidentiary
power in a fifteen-firm market (p5.05 for HHI=2845.7), but not in a twenty-
five-firm market. To ensure a competitive postacquisition market, the court
should therefore require that the defendants find approximately eleven more
distant dairies ready to serve the MSP/MSA.'" Viewed from the stochastic
market perspective, the involvement of more firms would be evidence that the
level of concentration observed in 1990 was more likely to have been the
result of chance over time than a consequence of market power. More firms
in the market would also increase the likelihood that some distant dairies will,
by chance, break out of the fringe and achieve substantial shares, thereby
reducing future concentration.
Faced with ease of entry evidence, a court wishing to apply the Gibrat
analytical framework should first inquire whether the Gibrat assumption of
size-independent growth rates is appropriate for the market. Second, the court
should ensure that the entrant firms face no barriers to entry, so that an
increase in n accurately accounts for their possible entry. Third, the court
should determine whether the increase in n is sufficient to create statistical
uncertainty about the competitive structure of the market.
Even if the Gibrat assumptions are inappropriate for a particular market,
a court should recognize that the determination of anticompetitive effect
requires that it adopt some set of dynamic market assumptions. Those
assumptions should be explicit in the trial record, thereby limiting the
precedential value of each case to markets with similar dynamic properties. In
this way, the case law on horizontal mergers can avoid turning ease of entry
into a trump and, instead, can develop coherently according to rational
economic principles.
Antitrust jurisprudence has been remarkably responsive to the economic
analysis embodied in the 1982, 1984, and 1992 DOJ Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. By recognizing and expounding the dynamic features of that
analysis, the courts can make substantial progress toward a unified horizontal
177. Because Tables 3 and 4 present approximate confidence intervals for observed HHI. this
discussion should not be taken to suggest dispositive thresholds for the number of firms, but only the
overall structure of analysis within the Gibrat framework. See supra note 137. In all cases, greater precision
may be obtained through more fact-specific dynamic modeling of market stucture.
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merger doctrine. Extrapolating from the arc of economic sophistication
between Von's Grocery178 and Kraft General Foods,"79 there is every
reason to believe that they will.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has presented a framework for drawing statistical inferences
from the most common forms of evidence presented in recent horizontal
merger cases. By balancing the issues of market concentration, ease of entry,
and concentration trends quantitatively, this framework can provide guidance
in weighing evidence in a field where little or no case law exists.
More importantly, this Note has provided a new and useful interpretation
of the horizontal merger doctrine. As a probabilistic treatment, it acknowledges
the uncertainty inherent in using the HHI as a proxy for market power. High
HHI values are accepted as evidence of market power not because markets
satisfy strict, static, microeconomic assumptions,1w but because they are
much more likely to occur as the result of anticompetitive market conditions
than by pure chance. Low barriers to entry rebut this evidence, not because
ease of entry always trumps concentration,"' ! but because the entry of more
firms makes concentration by chance more likely. Concentration trends are
relevant not because the history of a market will repeat itself, 2 but because
trend lines usually point toward equilibria, obeying the law of regression
toward the mean. The perspective of "antitrust by chance" thus appears to be
founded not only in advanced statistical methods, but also in common sense.
178. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
179. 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
180. See, e.g., Kwoka, supra note 20. at 924-26.
181. See Hsu, supra note 3, at 75.
182. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank. 374 U.S. 321. 367 (1963) (ruling that "trend toward
concentration" would make it necessary to prevent first merger in 40-bank market before -30 more
Philadelphia banks were absorbed").
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF MATHEMATICAL PROPOSITIONS




Suppose that (Xi) is a sequence of mutually independent, identically
distributed random variables. Then, as n--oo, the distribution of
P" = llogio(lOXl° + " -+ loX.,10)
is asymptotically normal with mean
10loglo(n E(1OXI/1°))
and variance
100 Var( 10 x
°10)
n(log 10 E( 1 0 X 1/1°)) 2
Marlow proved this result in order to explain empirical distributions of
noise levels when measured on a decibel scale.184 A change from base 10 to
base e is necessary for the purposes of this Note. The substitutions
Xj'=(XjloglO)/lO, i=1, .. . , n yield:
COROLLARY 1.
Suppose that (Xi) is a sequence of mutually independent, identically
distributed random variables. Then, as n----o, the distribution of
n
P, = log expXi
i=1




n (E (expX1 ))2
183. See Marlow, supra note 136, at 2086.
184. See id. at 2082.
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PROPOSITION 2.
For i=1, . . . , t and j=l, .... n, let (Zplog(l+e,,)) be a sequence of
independent random variables normally distributed with mean z and variance
s
2
. Then, as n----oo, the distribution of
n I L l g -- , ( I + e , ) 1
H. = log Ej 
-lej =I Ej= I-IT a (1 +e,)
is asymptotically normal with mean
tS2 - logn
and variance V, where
exp (4tS2 ) + 4exp (tS 2) - 5 - 4 (exp (4tS 2 ) - 1 )' 2 (exp(tS 2 ) - 1 )12
n
exp (4tS2 ) + 4exp(tS 2) - 5
n
PROOF.
Using the properties of sums of independent normal variables, the product
g I
+e(1+e))=expE log(1 + e)
i-I i-I
= exp E z,
1- I
forj=l, ... , n, can be rewritten as the lognormal exp X,, where each X, is an
independent random variable normally distributed with mean tz and variance
tS2. This gives
= lo ge )j 1 I /" R- - (I +e,,
=log exp(2Xj)- 2logE expX. (1)
j-1 J.I
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The expected value and variance of the lognormal exp X, where X is normally
distributed with mean X and variance s, are given by
E(exp X) = exp(X + s 2/2)
and
Var(exp X) = exp(2X + s2)(exp(s 2) - 1).
Thus, by Corollary 1, as n--o, the first term in (1) is asymptotically normal
with mean
logn + 2tZ + 2tS2
and variance
exp (4tS2) - 1.
n
and the second term in (1) is asymptotically normal with mean
2logn + 2tZ + tS2
and variance
4(exp (tS 2 ) - 1)
n
The distributions of these two terms have nonnegative correlation, since for
every y,
fn n
Pj-i exp(2X)>Y E exp(X/)>x
is nondecreasing in x (because of the convexity of the exponential
function). 85 The result now follows from the identity
X- Y=X-Y
and the inequality
Var(X - Y) = Var(X) + Var(Y) - 2Cov(X,Y)
= Var(X) + Var(Y) - 2 Corr(X, Y) (Var(X) Var(Y))lt
> Var(X) + Var(Y) -2(Var(X)Var(Y)) It2.
185. For various sufficient conditions for nonnegative correlation, see Kumar Jogdeo, Dependence,
Concepts of, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL SCIENCES 324, 326 (Samuel Kotz & Norman L. Johnson
eds., 1982).
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COROLLARY 2.
Let (Z) and Hn be as in Proposition 2, and suppose that parameters t, n,
z and S are chosen so that as n--oo,
E(H.) - log h
uniformly for some constant h, O<J/<1. Then
Var(H.) - v,
where
h4n3 +4h- 5 4(h 4n4 - 1)'12(hn - 1)'/2 v: Oh4n3 + 4h 5
n n n

